Chancellor Rachel Reeves’ recent declaration that “Brexit did deep damage” at her Mais lecture on Tuesday signals a profound shift within the Labour Party regarding its approach to the European Union. This sentiment, echoed by other government ministers, underscores a growing belief that a more ambitious “reset” of the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU is essential to address the country’s persistently sluggish economic performance.
The Economic Imperative for Deeper EU Ties
While Labour’s 2024 election manifesto proposed some renegotiation of the Trade and Co-operation Agreement – specifically aiming to end EU customs checks on food and agricultural exports by aligning Britain’s regulations – it maintained clear red lines: no return to the single market, the customs union, or freedom of movement, and no suggestion of rejoining the EU. This cautious stance was a direct response to the party’s heavy defeat in the 2019 election.
However, the tone has demonstrably changed. Following last autumn’s Budget, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer stated that “Brexit had significantly hurt our economy” and emphasized the need to “keep moving towards a close relationship with the EU.” Although the manifesto’s red lines were ostensibly intact, his remarks suggested a recognition that turning around Britain’s ailing economy necessitated a more ambitious approach to the reset.
Ministers Push for Greater Alignment
Several Labour ministers have been even more explicit. Health Secretary Wes Streeting, speaking at a literary festival in October, expressed relief that “Brexit is a problem whose name we now dare speak,” indicating his belief that being outside the EU hindered economic growth. Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy noted in a podcast that Brexit’s economic damage was “self-evident,” citing Turkey’s economic benefits from its customs agreement with the EU.
Further pressure for a policy rethink comes from within the party. On Wednesday, London Mayor Sadiq Khan called for the UK to rejoin the EU customs union and single market before the next election, advocating for a subsequent campaign promise to rejoin the EU entirely. While Chancellor Reeves, in her Mais lecture, reiterated that the red lines still stand, she clearly signalled a shift towards aligning the UK’s regulatory regime with the EU in more areas wherever it is in Britain’s interest. This move, she suggested, is crucial for delivering the economic growth Labour promised in the 2024 election campaign, which has largely eluded the government, with the economy growing by 1.3% in 2025, an improvement on 1.1% in 2024, but still below official forecasts of 1.5%.
The Electoral Miscalculation of 2019-2024
Labour’s initial post-2019 strategy was rooted in a desire to reconnect with working-class Leave voters, whose defection contributed to the collapse of the “Red Wall” seats. The party believed regaining power hinged on winning back these traditional Labour voters who had backed Leave in 2016 and Boris Johnson in 2019.
However, despite winning the 2024 election, Labour made relatively little progress in reconnecting with working-class Leave voters. Data from the British Election Study and the National Centre for Social Research indicates that 80% of Labour’s support in 2024 came from people who would vote to rejoin the EU, only slightly down from 86% in 2019. The party was significantly more successful at winning over 2019 Tory voters who backed rejoining the EU than those who wanted to stay out. Moreover, Labour’s advance among working-class voters was no stronger than among middle-class voters, suggesting the strategy of prioritizing Leave voters had limited impact.
Current Political Headwinds and Shifting Focus
Now, nearly two years on from the 2024 election, Labour faces even more serious electoral challenges. So far this month, polls average the party’s standing at just 19%, trailing Reform, whose support is predominantly from Brexit backers, by eight points. One in ten 2024 Labour voters have shifted to Nigel Farage’s party.
Crucially, Reform’s rise is not the primary source of Labour’s current electoral woes. For every voter who has switched from Labour to Reform since 2024, almost twice as many (19%) have moved to the resurgent Greens, and another 8% have defected to the Liberal Democrats. While those moving to Reform are almost exclusively Leavers, the majority of those switching to the Greens or Liberal Democrats are rejoiners. Consequently, Labour’s vote is down by nine points since 2024 among Leave supporters, but it has fallen by a more significant 19 points among Remain supporters.
Voter Sentiment and Policy Nuance
This electoral dynamic makes it clear that Labour is unlikely to restore its fortunes solely by appealing to Brexit-backing Reform voters. The party also needs to win back pro-EU minded voters who have gravitated towards parties explicitly favouring an eventual reversal of Brexit.
Polling data supports this shift in focus. A YouGov poll from last June found that while 76% of 2024 Labour voters supported “Britain having a closer relationship with the European Union, without rejoining the European Union, the Single Market, or the Customs Union,” a higher 82% of Labour voters in the same poll supported “Britain rejoining the European Union.” More recently, in December, YouGov reported that 73% of 2024 Labour voters supported “starting negotiations for Britain to rejoin the European Union.”
While specific elements of Labour’s current reset strategy, such as a veterinary agreement to remove paperwork on food and drink exports, appear popular (63% support among 2024 Labour voters in a January last year BMG poll), the popularity of such measures can be sensitive to how trade-offs are presented to voters, as a Redfield & Wilton poll from the same period indicated when asking about the implications of following EU laws versus maintaining UK regulations for food.
The evolving economic landscape and compelling electoral data suggest that Labour’s strategic pivot towards a more overtly pro-EU stance is not merely a rhetorical shift but a pragmatic response to both economic realities and the composition of its current and potential voter base. The party’s path to electoral recovery appears increasingly intertwined with a more ambitious engagement with the European Union, moving beyond the cautious red lines that defined its post-2019 approach.


