A fundamental recalibration of Labour’s Brexit strategy is underway, with the party increasingly targeting pro-EU voters rather than those who backed Leave, according to analysis by Professor Sir John Curtice of the University of Strathclyde. This pivot, driven by persistent economic sluggishness and recent electoral setbacks, marks a notable departure from the party’s post-2019 election stance.
Chancellor Rachel Reeves underscored this shift in her Mais lecture on Tuesday, stating unequivocally that “Brexit did deep damage.” While insisting the government was not attempting to “turn back the clock” on Brexit, Reeves signalled a clear intent for a “deeper relationship” with the EU, asserting it was “in the interest of the whole of Europe.” This overt acknowledgement of Brexit’s perceived harms reflects a growing belief within the government that a more ambitious “reset” of the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU is essential to revive the country’s ailing economic performance. The economy, for instance, grew by 1.3% in 2025, an improvement on 1.1% in 2024, but still fell short of official forecasts of 1.5%.
Labour’s 2024 election manifesto had already proposed some renegotiation of the Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA), specifically aiming to eliminate EU customs checks on food and agricultural exports by aligning Britain’s regulations with those of the EU. However, it maintained clear red lines: no return to the single market, the customs union, or freedom of movement, and no suggestion of rejoining the EU. This cautious approach was a direct consequence of the party’s heavy defeat in the 2019 election, where it sought to reconnect with working-class Leave voters who had defected to the Conservatives, contributing to the collapse of the ‘Red Wall’ seats.
However, the party’s tone has evolved significantly. Shortly after last autumn’s Budget, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer declared that “Brexit had significantly hurt our economy” and that Britain needed to “keep moving towards a close relationship with the EU.” While the manifesto’s red lines were ostensibly intact, his statement suggested a growing conviction that a more ambitious approach was necessary to stimulate economic growth.
Some ministers have expressed even more forthright views. Health Secretary Wes Streeting, speaking at a literary festival in October, remarked, “I’m glad that Brexit is a problem whose name we now dare speak,” indicating his belief that being outside the EU was impeding economic growth. Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy noted in a podcast that Brexit’s economic damage was “self-evident,” citing Turkey’s economic benefits from its customs agreement with the EU. Further evidence of internal pressure emerged on Wednesday when London Mayor Sadiq Khan called for the UK to rejoin the EU customs union and single market before the next election, and then campaign on a promise to rejoin the EU.
While Chancellor Reeves stressed the continued validity of the manifesto’s red lines, her Mais lecture clearly signalled a shift towards aligning the UK’s regulatory regime with the EU in more areas, wherever it serves Britain’s interest. Such a step, she suggested, is crucial for delivering the economic growth Labour promised in the 2024 election campaign, which has largely eluded the government thus far.
This strategic shift is not merely an economic calculation; it carries significant political implications. The initial post-2019 strategy aimed to win back working-class Leave voters, but data from the British Election Study and the National Centre for Social Research indicate that Labour made relatively little progress in this regard between 2019 and 2024. In the 2024 election, 80% of Labour’s support came from individuals who favoured rejoining the EU, only slightly down from 86% in 2019. The party was notably more successful in attracting 2019 Tory voters who backed rejoining the EU than those who wished to remain outside.
Currently, Labour faces considerable electoral challenges. Polls this month place the party’s standing at just 19%, trailing Reform by eight points, a party whose support predominantly comes from Brexit backers. One in ten of those who voted Labour in 2024 are now supporting Reform. However, Sir John Curtice’s analysis reveals that Reform’s ascent is not the primary cause of Labour’s current difficulties. For every voter who has switched from Labour to Reform since 2024, almost twice as many (19%) have moved to the resurgent Greens, and another 8% have defected to the Liberal Democrats. Crucially, while Labour-to-Reform switchers are almost exclusively Leavers, the majority of those moving to the Greens or Liberal Democrats are rejoiners.
This dynamic is reflected in the polling data: Labour’s vote has fallen by nine points since 2024 among Leave voters, but by a more substantial 19 points among Remain supporters. This makes it clear that Labour is unlikely to restore its electoral fortunes solely by appealing to Brexit-backing Reform voters. The party must also win back pro-EU minded voters who have migrated to parties advocating for an eventual reversal of Brexit.
Labour’s previous strategy presumed that a ‘reset’ of the EU relationship, without rejoining, would satisfy its pro-EU base without alienating its minority of Brexiteers. While a YouGov poll last June showed 76% of 2024 Labour voters supported a “closer relationship… without rejoining,” with only 11% opposed, this does not equate to a preference over rejoining. The same poll indicated that 82% of Labour voters supported “Britain rejoining the European Union,” with just 12% against. More recently, in December, YouGov reported 73% of 2024 Labour voters supported “starting negotiations for Britain to rejoin the European Union,” compared to 18% opposed.
Even the core elements of Labour’s proposed ‘reset’, such as eliminating customs checks on food and agricultural exports through a veterinary agreement, show nuanced support. While a BMG poll in January last year found 63% of 2024 Labour voters supported such an agreement (10% opposed), Redfield & Wilton secured a very different result when presenting voters with the relevant trade-offs. This suggests that while a deeper relationship is broadly popular, the specifics and their associated costs present a more complex picture for public opinion.
The evolving data, particularly the significant loss of pro-EU voters to the Greens and Liberal Democrats, underscores a profound shift in the political landscape. Labour’s strategic pivot towards a more overtly pro-EU stance, even if still constrained by existing red lines, appears to be a pragmatic response to its current electoral vulnerabilities and the perceived economic necessity of closer ties with Europe. The party’s challenge now lies in navigating this shift without alienating its remaining, albeit smaller, contingent of Leave-supporting voters, while simultaneously convincing disillusioned Remainers that its approach offers a credible path forward.
